O objetivo desta reflexão é estabelecer um diálogo entre os espaços da educação, filosofia e política, buscando construir pontes entre eles. Seu embasamento teórico se refere à crítica ao capitalismo e ao conceito de reificação, a partir de autores da Escola de Frankfurt, de Foucault e de Benjamin. Um episódio ocorrido em 29 de abril de 2015 foi escolhido para análise por representar um evento paradoxal nos campos e conceitos apontados. Concluímos que é necessário se repensar novas ações entre as (...) práticas educativas, as ações políticas e os saberes filosóficos, nos quais seus sujeitos sociais tenham disponibilidade ao diálogo, ao respeito e à democracia. (shrink)

The eleventh-century philosopher and physician Abu Ali ibn Sina (d. A.D. 1037) was known in the West by his Latinized name Avicenna. An analysis of the sources and evolution of Avicenna's metaphysics, this book focuses on the answers he and his predecessors gave to two fundamental pairs of questions: what is the soul and how does it cause the body; and what is God and how does He cause the world? To respond to these challenges, Avicenna invented new concepts and (...) distinctions and reinterpreted old ones. The author concludes that Avicenna's innovations are a turning point in the history of metaphysics. Avicenna's metaphysics is the culmination of a period of synthesis during which philosophers fused together a Neoplatonic project (reconciling Plato with Aristotle) with a Peripatetic project (reconciling Aristotle with himself). Avicenna also stands at the beginning of a period during which philosophers sought to integrate the Arabic version of the earlier synthesis with Islamic doctrinal theology (kalam). Avicenna's metaphysics significantly influenced European scholastic thought, but it had an even more profound impact on Islamic intellectual history--the philosophical problems and opportunities associated with the Avicennian synthesis continued to be debated up to the end of the nineteenth century. (shrink)

É a metafísica uma ciência a priori ou a posteriori’? Suárez e a fundamentação da metafísica Resumo: Contra a interpretação de François Courtine, Rolf Darge afirma que para Francisco Suárez a metafísica é uma ciência que trata do ente entendido não como aquilo que pode ser objeto para a mente humana, mas como aquilo que é apto a existir de fato. A metafísica seria uma ciência real, entre outras razões, porque ela é uma ciência a posteriori. Este artigo pretende verificar (...) melhor a afirmação de que a metafísica de Suárez é uma ciência a posteriori. Pois, se de fato for assim, a interpretação realista que Rolf Darge oferece da metafísica de Suárez adquire maior plausibilidade. Palavras-chave: objeto da metafísica; empirismo; realismo. Is metaphysics an a priori or an a posteriori Science? Suárez and the foundation of metaphysics. Abstract: Against the interpretation of François Courtine, Rolf Darge affirms that for Francisco Suárez metaphysics is a science that deals not with being as that which can be an object for the human mind, but with being as that which is apt to actually exist. Metaphysics would be a real science, among other reasons, because it is a posteriori science. This article aims to verify the claim that Suárez's metaphysics is a posteriori science. If this is so, the realistic interpretation that Rolf Darge offers of Suárez's metaphysics acquires greater plausibility. Key-words: object of metaphysics; empiricism; realism. La métaphysique est-elle une science a priori ou a posteriori? Suárez et le fondement de la métaphysique. Résumé: Contre l'interprétation de François Courtine, Rolf Darge affirme que pour Francisco Suárez la métaphysique est une science qui traite de l'étant compris non comme ce qui peut être un objet pour l'esprit humain, mais comme ce qui est susceptible d'exister réellement. La métaphysique serait une vraie science, entre autres raisons, car c'est une science a posteriori. Cet article vise à mieux vérifier l'affirmation selon laquelle la métaphysique de Suárez est une science a posteriori. S'il en est ainsi, l'interprétation réaliste que propose Rolf Darge de la métaphysique de Suárez acquiert une plus grande plausibilité. Mots-clés: objet de la métaphysique; empirisme; réalisme. Data de registro: 16/09/2021 Data de aceite: 20/10/2021. (shrink)

Morphology is the science of form. The word is used in various scientific disciplines, e.g. in geography, linguistics, etc., but it is most frequently employed to denote that part of Biology which deals with the forms of organisms. The mere description of spatial relations, however, scarcely constitutes a science. It may be hard to say by what property science is distinguished from other human endeavors, but that factual description does not suffice is generally admitted. To establish relations between facts may (...) be taken as a preliminary answer. It would still remain to define these relations. The answer to that question, however, depends largely on the particular brand of philosophy to which an author happens to subscribe. Most answers have been formulated by focusing attention largely on physics and related sciences. (shrink)

This book is concerned with the role of intuitions in the justification of philosophical theory. The author begins by demonstrating how contemporary philosophers, whether engaged in case-driven analysis or seeking reflective equilibrium, rely on intuitions as evidence for their theories. The author then provides an account of the nature of philosophical intuitions and distinguishes them from other psychological states. Finally, the author defends the use of intuitions as evidence by demonstrating that arguments for skepticism about their evidential value are either (...) self-defeating or guilty of arbitrary and unjustified partiality towards non-intuitive modes of knowledge. (shrink)

O artigo acompanha a reflexão de alguns autores do século XX no que se refere à questão do conhecimento, sobretudo nas discussões em torno da dicotomia mente e mundo. Esses autores são McDowell, Putnam e Rorty. A ênfase é colocada na importância e na necessidade de que aquele que contemporaneamente investiga algum aspecto da realidade, se ocupe também em refletir sobre os pressupostos e fundamentos que operam na sua teoria e na sua prática. Os autores em questão indicam algumas dificuldades (...) e movimentos que acontecem no âmbito das teorias do conhecimento, de modo a ajudar o pesquisador atual a compreender as aporias que percorrem os substratos fundamentadores do seu pensar e fazer investigativo. (shrink)

O pensamento de Heidegger, através da analítica existencial e da proposta de destruição da metafísica, elabora um novo horizonte a partir do qual o conhecimento pode ser compreendido. Não mais da objetificação, dos dualismos sujeito e objeto, mente e mundo, mas a partir do lugar originário, do ser-aí em sua facticidade, do seu ser-no-mundo. O texto pretende mostrar e caracterizar esse horizonte originário e prévio, além de indicar algumas possibilidades que com ele se abrem. Daremos ênfase à questão do horizonte (...) compreensivo prévio, que acompanha cada conhecimento e cada conhecer, mas que tende a se manter oculto e esquecido em função da primazia do ente na Metafísica tradicional. Inicial e normalmente vivemos e pensamos a partir da disponibilidade e da presença dos entes, do que se chama de realidade. Há que retomar a historicidade e a temporalidade do ser humano como condições básicas que acompanham o fenômeno do conhecimento e, por isso, da noção de possibilidade e de abertura. Uma volta para as condições pré-teóricas e pré-lógicas do conhecimento, onde o fundamento é segundo o modo de ser do ser-aí, a facticidade, um abismo, o ser-no-mundo a partir donde se constituem as relações cognoscitivas e práticas. O conhecimento humano é finito, assim como o é o próprio ser humano e, por isso, não possui lugar fora do tempo onde possa ser ancorado e fixado. Há uma circularidade interpretativa e uma diferença ontológica já sempre em operação e que não podem ser superadas por teorias do conhecimento, mas devem ser autenticamente assumidas para que o conhecimento seja compreendido no seu ser. Palavras-chave: Conhecimento. Hermenêutica. Metafísica. Heidegger. Diferença ontológica. (shrink)

This entry addresses the nature and epistemological role of intuition by considering the following questions: (1) What are intuitions?, (2) What roles do they serve in philosophical (and other “armchair”) inquiry?, (3) Ought they serve such roles?, (4) What are the implications of the empirical investigation of intuitions for their proper roles?, and (5) What is the content of intuitions prompted by the consideration of hypothetical cases?

Durante longo tempo tentou-se, no âmbito da Economia Política e de outras áreas, compreender como se deu o surgimento do sistema de produção capitalista, como se deu a transição do regime feudal, pautado nas relações entre vassalos e suseranos, para um regime baseado na relação entre trabalhadores “livres” e patrões, no qual os primeiros venderiam sua força de trabalho para os segundos e estes, por sua vez, explorariam os primeiros para a obtenção de lucro, sem que houvesse uma coerção formal (...) dos trabalhadores permanecerem na fábrica do patrão tal como ocorria com os servos medievais, os quais eram obrigados a permanecer nas terras do senhor feudal. A compreensão desse processo foi e tem sido fundamental para os diversos ativismos políticos existentes. Nesse sentido, este artigo visa analisar três perspectivas acerca deste período de transição e de surgimento do capitalismo, três obras relevantes para a história do capitalismo, a saber: O Capital, de Karl Marx (em particular, o seu Capítulo 24 – “A assim chamada acumulação primitiva”), A Ética Protestante e o “Espírito” do Capitalismo, de Max Weber, e Calibã e a Bruxa, de Silvia Federici. O artigo irá se dividir em cinco partes: uma breve introdução, sobre a relação entre o ativismo político e a compreensão histórica do capitalismo, três partes dedicadas à exposição pormenorizada das teses que estruturam os textos de cada um dos autores supracitados, discorrendo acerca das suas visões concernentes à questão do surgimento e do desenvolvimento do capitalismo e, por fim, uma parte conclusiva, relacionando e contrapondo mais diretamente estes posicionamentos e reflexões, que não são totalmente coerentes entre si. (shrink)

Por meio de uma revisão integrativa, busca-se identificar, dentro da produção científica brasileira, artigos que fazem intersecção entre os temas do luto e da velhice, sob o olhar da psicanálise. Desta forma, se visa estabelecer qual o enfoque dado ao idoso e qual a visão apresentada pela psicanálise para um trabalho com esta população que se encontra mais propensa a rupturas e perdas. Assim, se reconhece que há uma identificação de morte e finitude vinculada à figura do sujeito que envelhece, (...) mentalidade adotada pela lógica de consumo. Identificou-se de que forma as inúmeras perdas aliadas ao envelhecimento suscitam no idoso um processo de luto que, segundo a psicanálise, pode ser definido como o afeto resultante da perda de um objeto libidinal. Verifica-se, assim, a importância de um acompanhamento aos idosos que vise desobstruir a via do desejo e criar novas perspectivas de vida, sobretudo nesta fase do desenvolvimento, que como todas as outras, possui características e desafios particulares. (shrink)

Resumo: Nas Disputationes metaphysicae Francisco Suarez tenta mostrar que a causa final não é uma projeção do intelecto humano, mas algo real nas próprias coisas e que sem ela não é possível dar uma explicação satisfatória dos fatos observados na experiência. Ele mostra como a causa final age no ser humano, em Deus, nos chamados ‘agentes naturais’ e no universo como um todo. De fato, a causa final supõe a existência de algo capaz de conhecer um fim e de direcionar (...) suas ações para ele. Mas isto não significa que o fim está totalmente ausente das operações dos ‘agentes naturais’, nem que a explicação teleológica nunca faça sentido para eles. Sob certo aspecto há intencionalidade mesmo nas operações dos entes não-racionais, pois toda a natureza está submetida à ação e à racionalidade divina.: In the Disputationes metaphysicae Francisco Suarez tries to show that final cause is not a projection of human intellect, but something real in things themselves, and that it is not possible to satisfactorily explain empirical data without it. He shows how final cause operates in human beings, in God, in so-called ‘natural agents’, and in the universe as a whole. In fact, final cause presupposes the existence of something which is able to know an end and to direct its actions towards that end. This does not imply, however, that the end is totally absent from the operations of ‘natural agents’, nor that teleological explanation never makes sense for them. From a certain point of view, there is intentionality even in the operations of non-rational beings, because all nature is subject to divine action and rationality. (shrink)

Ante o fato de que as coisas são singulares e o conhecimento cientifico é universal, Duns Escoto, preocupado em fundamentar a possibilidade da ciência, coloca-se a questão: a natureza, em si mesma, é individual ou universal? Sua resposta, acompanhando a de Avicena, é a de que a natureza, em si mesma, não é nem universal, nem singular, mas indiferente a ambas.

Suarez precursor de Descartes? A doutrina suazeriana sobre a causa final revista Resumo: Stephan Schmid busca mostrar que Francisco Suárez é um precursor da crítica que Descartes fez à causalidade final na explicação da natureza. Suárez teria reduzido a noção de causa à causa eficiente, teria eliminado a presença da causa final nas ações dos agentes naturais, isto é, daqueles entes que não possuem intelecto, e teria eliminado a presença da causa final nas ações divinas. Deste modo, ele seria um (...) precursor do pensamento mecanicista de Descartes e, sob certo aspecto, também de Espinosa. Contra esta interpretação, procuro mostrar que Suárez não reduz a noção de causa à causa eficiente, não elimina a presença da causa final nem nos agentes naturais, nem na ação divina e que, portanto, ele não pode ser considerado, neste assunto, um precursor de Descartes nem de Espinosa. Palavras-Chave: Metafísica. Causa eficiente. Causa final.: Stephan Schmid try to show that Francisco Suárez is a forerunner of the criticism made by Descartes of end causes in the explanation of nature. The hypothesis is that Suárez had reduced the notion of cause to efficient cause, had eliminated the presence of end causes in the actions of the natural agents, i. e., of the beings that have not an intellect, and had eliminated the presence of end causes in the actions of God. In this way he would be a forerunner of the mechanistic thought of Descartes and, from a certain aspect, of Spinoza. Against this interpretation I try to show that Suárez do not reduce the notion of cause to efficient cause and that he eliminates the presence of end cause neither in the natural agents nor in the actions of God. Therefore, he should be considered in this issue a forerunner neither of Descartes nor of Spinoza. Keywords: Metaphysics. Efficient cause. End cause. Résumé: Stephan Schmid essaie de montrer que Francisco Suárez est um précurseur de la critique faite par Descartes à la cause finale dans l’explication de la nature. Suárez aurait réduit la notion de cause à la cause efficiente, elimine la présence de la cause finale dans les actions des agentes naturels, c'est-à-dire, de ceux qui ne possèdent pas d'intellect, et aurait elimine la présence de la cause finale dans les actions divines. Il serait ainsi um précurseur de la pensée mécaniste de Descartes et, dans une certaine mesure, de Spinoza. Contre cette interprétation, j'essaie de montrer que Suárez ne réduit pas la notion de cause à la cause efficiente, n'élimine pas la présence de la cause finale ni dans les agentes naturels ni dans l'action divine et qu'il ne peut donc être considéré comme um précurseur de Descartes ni d'Espinosa. Mots clés: Metaphysique. Cause finale. Cause eficiente. Data de registro: 13/05/2019 Data de aceite: /10/2019. (shrink)

Honnefelder, Ludger. Im Spannungsfeld von Ethik und Religion. Berlin. 2014. Kap.11.

Plusieurs commentateurs n’ont retenu que le premier moment de la dialectique du sacré de Mircea Eliade, celui essentialiste où l’archétype surplombe l’histoire, négligeant de considérer le second où l’archétype n’existe qu’à travers sa réalisation dans l’histoire. Ils donnent ainsi l’impression qu’Eliade est un penseur anhistorique qui conçoit le temps surtout à partir de l’éternité et non pour lui-même. Une analyse plus serrée révèle cependant qu’Eliade est un penseur beaucoup plus historique qu’il n’y paraît à première vue. En effet, Eliade considère (...) le miracle de l’Incarnation comme étant la hiérophanie suprême et les autres hiérophanies comme ses préfigurations. (shrink)

Este texto é uma interpretação do primeiro capítulo d’O Anti-Édipo, de Deleuze e Guattari, mais como uma escrita do que como uma leitura. Ou seja, não há aqui intenção de descobrir uma verdade escondida para um texto que, de início, se propõe um “processo esquizofrênico”. De todo modo, divido esta minha escrita em quatro momentos: primeiramente, com uma análise do filme Incêndios (2010), tentando mostrar como um enredo aparentemente edipiano (no sentido psicanalítico) é muito mais rico que o Édipo; em (...) segundo lugar, com uma exposição das três sínteses maquínico-desejantes, ou do inconsciente, desenvolvidas por Deleuze e Guattari; em terceiro lugar, com uma apresentação da ofensiva promovida pela “psiquiatria materialista” deleuzeguattariana em relação a certos autores psicanalistas como Reich, Lacan e Melanie Klein; por fim, com um aprofundamento das questões éticas e teóricas implicadas neste primeiro capítulo do livro, sobretudo aquelas ligadas ao projeto geral da obra: uma crítica econômico-libidinal do capitalismo, tendo em conta seus aspectos “esquizofrênicos” e mostrando a contribuição inestimável da psicanálise para este mesmo sistema econômico-libidinal. (shrink)

We offer a particularist defense of conspiratorial thinking. We explore the possibility that the presence of a certain kind of evidence—what we call "fortuitous data"—lends rational credence to conspiratorial thinking. In developing our argument, we introduce conspiracy theories and motivate our particularist approach (§1). We then introduce and define fortuitous data (§2). Lastly, we locate an instance of fortuitous data in one real world conspiracy, the Watergate scandal (§3).

This volume brings together a collection of essays that explore in a new way how unacknowledged moral concerns are integral to debates in the philosophy of mind.The radical suggestion of the book is that we can make sense of the internal dynamics and cultural significance of these debates only when we understand the moral forces that shape them. Drawing inspiration from a variety of traditions including Wittgenstein, Lacan, phenomenology and analytic philosophy, the authors address a wide range of topics including (...) the mind/body-problem, the problem of other minds, subjectivity and objectivity, the debates on mindreading, naturalism, reductive physicalism, representationalism and the ‘E-turn’; Dennett’s heterophenomenology, McDowell’s neo-Kantianism, Wittgenstein’s ‘private language’ considerations and his notion of an ‘attitude towards a soul’; repression, love, conscience, the difficulties of self-understanding, and the methods and aims of philosophy. Through a combination of detailed, immanent criticism and bold constructive work, the authors move the discussion to a new level, beyond humanistic or conservative critiques of naturalism and scientism. (shrink)

Between the 1930s and the mid 1970s, it was commonly believed that in 1880 Karl Marx had proposed to dedicate to Charles Darwin a volume or translation of Capital but that Darwin had refused. The detail was often interpreted by scholars as having larger significance for the question of the relationship between Darwinian evolutionary biology and Marxist political economy. In 1973–4, two scholars working independently—Lewis Feuer, professor of sociology at Toronto, and Margaret Fay, a graduate student at Berkeley—determined simultaneously that (...) the traditional story of the proposed dedication was untrue, being based on a long-standing misinterpretation of the relevant correspondence. Between the two, and among several other scholars who became their respective allies, there developed a contest of authority and priority over the discovery. From 1975 to 1982, the controversy generated a considerable volume of spilled ink in both scholarly and popular publications. Drawing on previously unexamined archival resources, this article revisits the ‘case’ of the so-called ‘Darwin–Marx correspondence’ as an instance of the phenomenon of ‘multiple discovery’. A familiar occurrence in the natural sciences, multiple discovery is rarer in the humanities and social sciences. The present case of a priority dispute in the history of ideas followed patterns familiar from such disputes in the natural sciences, while also diverging from them in ways that shed light on the significance of disciplinary norms and research infrastructures. (shrink)

One of liberalism’s core commitments is to safeguarding individuals’ autonomy. And a central aspect of liberal social justice is the commitment to protecting the vulnerable. Taken together, and combined with an understanding of autonomy as an acquired set of capacities to lead one’s own life, these commitments suggest that liberal societies should be especially concerned to address vulnerabilities of individuals regarding the development and maintenance of their autonomy. In this chapter, we develop an account of what it would mean for (...) a society to take seriously the obligation to reduce individuals’ autonomy-related vulnerabilities to an acceptable minimum. In particular, we argue that standard liberal accounts underestimate the scope of this obligation because they fail to appreciate various threats to autonomy. (shrink)

We provide self-contained proof of a theorem relating probabilistic coherence of forecasts to their non-domination by rival forecasts with respect to any proper scoring rule. The theorem recapitulates insights achieved by other investigators, and clarifi es the connection of coherence and proper scoring rules to Bregman divergence.

We add texture to the conclusion of Duchon and Drake (Journal of Business Ethics, 85, 2009, 301) that extreme narcissism is associated with unethical conduct. We argue that the special features possessed by financial accounting facilitate extreme narcissism in susceptible CEOs. In particular, we propose that extremely narcissistic CEOs are key players in a recurring discourse cycle facilitated by financial accounting language and measures. Such CEOs project themselves as the corporation they lead, construct a narrative about the corporation and themselves (...) using financial accounting measures, and then reflect on how their accounting-constructed performance is perceived by stakeholders. We do not present empirical evidence about whether the use of accounting language and measures leads to unethical behaviour by extreme narcissistic CEOs — although the conclusions of Duchon and Drake (2009) suggest empirical support is probable. Rather, we focus on developing alertness to the potential for accounting, when engaged by an extremely narcissistic CEO, to be a precursor or implement of unethical behaviour. (shrink)

According to the age-of-acquisition hypothesis, words acquired early in life are processed faster and more accurately than words acquired later. Connectionist models have begun to explore the influence of the age/order of acquisition of items (and also their frequency of encounter). This study attempts to reconcile two different methodological and theoretical approaches (proposed by Lambon Ralph & Ehsan, 2006 and Zevin & Seidenberg, 2002) to age-limited learning effects. The current simulations extend the findings reported by Zevin and Seidenberg (2002) that (...) have shown that frequency trajectories (FTs) have limited and specific effects on word-reading tasks. Using the methodological framework proposed by Lambon Ralph and Ehsan (2006), which makes it possible to compare word-reading and picture-naming tasks in connectionist networks, we were able to show that FT has a considerable influence on age-limited learning effects in a picture naming task. The findings show that when the input–output mappings are arbitrary (simulating picture naming tasks), the links formed by the network become entrenched as a result of early experience and that subsequent variations in frequency of exposure of the items have only a minor impact. In contrast, when the mappings between input-output are quasi-systematic or systematic (simulating word-reading tasks), the training of new items was generalized and resulted in the suppression of age-limited learning effects. At a theoretical level, we suggest that FT, which simultaneously takes account of time and the level of exposure across time, represents a more precise and modulated measure compared with the order of introduction of the items and may lead to innovative hypotheses in the field of age-limited learning effects. (shrink)

Many philosophers think there is a luck problem confronting libertarian models of free will. If free actions are undetermined, then it seems to be a matter of chance or luck that they occur—so the objection goes. Agent-causal libertarians have responded to this objection by asserting that free actions, in their essence, involve a direct causal relation between agents and the events they cause. So, free actions are not lucky after all. Not everyone, however, is convinced by this response. Al Mele (...) and Peter van Inwagen, for instance, argue that luckiness remains even if agent-causation exists. One way to answer their arguments, I suggest, is by appealing to considerations in metaphysical grounding and the associated idea of explanatory priority. Mele’s argument loses force if facts about which possible world is actual are partly grounded in facts about free choices themselves. And van Inwagen’s challenge can be met if facts about free actions are explanatorily prior to any objective probabilities associated with those actions. (shrink)

Should society intervene to prevent the risky behavior of precocious teenagers even if it would be impermissible to intervene with adults who engage in the same risky behavior? The problem is well illustrated by the legal case of the 13-year-old Dutch girl Laura Dekker, who set out in 2009 to become the youngest person ever to sail around the world alone, succeeding in January 2012. In this paper we use her case as a point of entry for discussing the fundamental (...) question of how to demarcate childhood from adulthood. After summarizing the case, we identify a ‘demarcation dilemma’ that frames much of the public and expert debate. On the one hand, it seems morally imperative ‘to treat like alike’, which means that both children and adults should be allowed to undertake all actions for which they have the relevant competences. On the other hand, requiring proportional treatment of children and adults seems to neglect the special nature of childhood as a distinct stage in life that ends at a specific age. We introduce the notion of a ‘regime of childhood’ to deal with this problem. This regime includes several dimensions, including the limited liability for children, the supervisory responsibilities of parents, the role of age-based thresholds, and the overarching purpose of childhood as a context for developing autonomy. We argue that, all things considered, there are good reasons not to shift to a regime that offers individual children the option of qualifying for adulthood on the basis of age-neutral criteria. (shrink)

The Liber de causis, a monotheistic reworking of Proclus' Elements of Theology, was translated from Arabic into Latin in the twelfth century, with an attribution to Aristotle. Considering this Neoplatonic text a product of Aristotle's school and even the completion of Aristotle's Metaphysics, Albert the Great concluded his series of Aristotelian paraphrases by commenting on it. To do so was to invite controversy, since accidents of translation had made many readers think that the Liber de causis taught that God made (...) only the first creature, which in turn created the diverse multitude of lesser things. Thus, Albert's contemporaries in the Christian West took the text to uphold the supposedly Aristotelian doctrine that from the One only one thing can emanate--a doctrine they rejected, believing as they did that God freely determined the number and kinds of creatures. Albert, however, defended the philosophers against the theologians of his day, denying that the thesis "from the One only one proceeds" removed God's causality from the diversity and multiplicity of our world. This Albert did by appealing to a greater theologian, Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, and equating the being that is the subject of metaphysics with the procession of Being from God's intellect, a procession Dionysius described in On the Divine Names. Creation as Emanation examines Albert's reading of the Liber de causis with an eye toward two questions: First, how does Albert view the relation between faith and reason, so that he can identify creation from nothing with emanation from God? And second, how does he understand Platonism and Aristotelianism, so that he can avoid the misreadings of his fellow theologians by finding in a late-fifth-century Neoplatonist the key to Aristotle's meaning? (shrink)